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Experts believe that draft would require a larger number of accessions, since draftees
and draft-motivated volunteers are more likely to leave military service than volunteers
at their first opportunity.
This thesis presents evidence on this issue. We are able to compare retention
behaviour and service lengths of draftees and volunteers in the same cohort by using
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Economists have theorized that volunteers should have higher retention rates than
draftees. Because draftees are in the military unvoluntarily, they are expected to be more
likely to leave the military at their first opportunity. Volunteers on the other hand, show
bv their choice that thev have a taste for military life. Therefore, they are more likelv
to stay. [Ref. 1]
In this thesis, I compare retention behaviour of draftees and volunteers in the same
cohort by using the data files on enlistees during lottery draft years.
The general area of this research is the analysis of manpower data. The main object
is to compare retention rates and the effect of educational factors between draftees and
volunteers in the same period for the United States military services. I examine the
cohorts of draftees and volunteers who entered the military services in 1971 and 1972.
The results lead us to understand better the effect of draft and volunteer force policies.
In my research I answer following questions:
1. Is there a significant difference between the retention rates for draftees and those
for volunteers?
2. Are retention rates different for high school and non-high school graduates? If so.
what is the effect of high school education on retention rates for draftees and for
volunteers?
3. Is there any difference between retention rates for the 1971 and 1972 cohorts?
4. What are the policy implications of the research results?
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
To understand better what my study presents, the reader needs some background
about the lottery system and about events that occurred during the lottery draft years:
1970, 1971, 1972. I also review some of the studies done on the effect of educational
factors on retention rates.
Reference 2 gives an excellent history of the lottery draft. 1 A chronology of impor-
tant events involving the lottery draft is given in Appendix A. Events that occurred
during the lottery draft period are extremely important for understanding the results of
this thesis. In particular, the number of monthly draft calls, the lottery7 numbers, the
1 In this thesis, history of the lotterv draft is summarized from Reference 2.
ceilings, and legislation to reform the draft system all affected the behaviour of enlistees
during the lottery draft and during later periods.
1. The Lottery
After the Gates Commission recommended moving toward ending the draft, the
government's main objective was to reduce the draft calls. Withdrawals from Vietnam
also led the military services to reduce force strength. Lottery draft years were transition
years for the volunteer force. To operate the draft system more fairly, the government
implemented some reforms during the transition years.
In December 1969, Selective Service held the first draft lottery since 1940. The
President's lottery proposal, when finally implemented, would ameliorate most of
the objectionable features of the old system. Under the lottery the order of call was
provided by random selection of birthdays. The drawing would be made prior to a
young man's 19th birthday, and his 19th year would be his year of maximum vul-
nerability . If his sequence number was not called up during his 19th year, the
young man was placed lower in the order of call. For practical purposes, short of
all-out mobilization, his vulnerability was limited to one year. The primary age
group of 19-year-olds replaced the old procedure of the "oldest first" order of call.
With the order of call provided by chance, it was not necessary to grant wholesale
deferments to reduce the size of the manpower pool so that virtually all qualified and
available 26-year-olds would serve. The lottery system thus facilitated the curtail-
ment of deferments. [Ref. 2: pp.277]
Because draft calls were done beginning from the smallest lottery number, indi-
viduals who had smaller lottery numbers had the greatest chance of being drafted.
a. The Lottery Draft During 1970
The lottery did not run smoothly during the early months of 1970. The
main reason was the local boards. Some local boards drafted individuals who had lottery
numbers as high as 150 while the other boards did not have to draft individuals who had
lottery numbers more than 30 or 40. In order to solve the problem. Selective Service
established monthly ceilings on lottery numbers. On the other hand, because of the
ceiling on lottery numbers, many local boards could not draft enough enlistees to meet
their quotas. In other words, shortfalls occurred during 1970.
In 1970, draft calls were 163,000. Because of the shortfalls in the early
months of 1970. March and April draft calls were 19,000 per month. The high number
of draft calls decreased certainty about one's chances of being drafted and caused some
speculations in the public. To overcome these speculations, the government reduced the
draft calls: draft calls of 15,000 were announced for May and June. It was agreed that
draft calls would decline after June and would be about 150,000 for the year.
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In July 1970, the Army requested 42,000 draftees for September to Decem-
ber 1970. This number was over the anticipated 35.000 call that had been approved by
the Secretary of Defense in April for planning purposes. Finally, 39,000 draft calls were
approved for the four-month period, distributed as follows: 12,000 for September; 12.000
for October; 8,000 for November; and 7,000 for December. The draft calls totaled
163,500 for the entire year.
b. The Lottery Draft During 1971
During this period, there were some important reforms to the draft system.
The direct national call, authority to end student deferments, and the guarentee of
procedural rights became law in September 1971. The national call changed the system
of draft quotas allocated to local boards and states. The new system brought the idea
of inducting individuals on a national basis. The old system of draft quotas had reduced
the draft burden on states with proportionally more volunteers. According to the na-
tional call, equality was not among states but among individuals. Other than the direct
national call, deferments for marriage, paternity, graduate school, particular occupa-
tions, and undergraduates had been eliminated. All these reforms brought equality for
qualified young men.
Draft calls could not be reduced in the early months of 1971. Draft calls
were 17.000 per month from January through March. The April call was 15,000 and the
May call was 14.000. In spite of the "no raise in draft calls" rule , these numbers were
high. Because of further Vietnam withdrawals, the May call was cancelled and replaced
a call of 20.000 for May through June. The size of the Congressional cut in Army
strength was still not certain. Finally, the Department of Defense agreed on 16,000 calls
for May through June 1971 and 16,000 calls for July through August. Draft calls were
88,000 for the first eight months of 1971. In October, the Army had to reduce 300,000
from its June 1971 strength of 1,123,810 to its authorized strength of 812,000 for June
1972. This caused 10,000 draft calls for October through December. The Army entered
the new Fiscal year of 1972 with an "overstrength". The number of draft calls was 98,000
for 1971. Reduction in the stength level forced the Army to release over 200,000 per-
sonnel before their terms of service expired.
2 Secretary of Defense Laird's remarks before joint Community Orientation Conference 40,
April 28, 1970, OSD (Public Affairs files).
c. The Lottoy Draft During 1972
Draftees were not needed for January through March 1972. On March 6,
it was announced that 50,000 or less draftees would be needed for 1972. In May, the
Army estimated 17,000 draft calls for the remaining months of 1972. Finally, draft calls
were 50,000 for 1972. The announcement of the end of draft calls was made on January
27, 1973.
Table 1 summarizes the reductions in draft calls during 1970, 1971, and
1972.
Table 1. DRAFT CALLS FOR 1970. 1971, 1972




2. Effect of Educational Factors on Retention Rates
Quality is an important issue for the military services. Most of the studies
dealing with quality of enlistees examined the effect of educational factors and of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test(AFQT).
The relative ability of military personnel to learn military skills and perform
creditably in military units is usually referred to as the "quality" of the personnel.
The normal measures of quality for enlisted accessions are the percentage that have
graduated from high school, a sound indicator of the likelihood of succesfully com-
pleting an enlistment, and scores on the AFQT, a good predictor of success in mili-
tary training. [Ref. 3]
Earning a high school diploma is an important indicator of the probability that
a new enlistee will adjust successfully to military life. Also, as the research memorandum
"Summary Report: Manning the 600-ship Navy", done by the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) noted, high school diploma graduates(HSDGs) are preferred by the Navy be-
cause they are substantially more likely to complete their first term. According to the
Department of Defense. "A high school diploma is the best measure of a person's po-
tential for adapting to life in the military." [Ref. 4]
In the study of "Military Technolgy and Defense Manpower", the effect of the
high school diploma was explained in the following manner:
Through the years, experience has indicated that high school graduates are more
likely than dropouts to perform successfully in the armed forces. On average, they
are involved in fewer disciplinary incidents, they are promoted more rapidly, and
they are more likely to attain eligibilty to reenlist. [Ref 5]
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA; LIMITATIONS.
I use the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) cohort files. [Ref. 6] These files
have data about the enlistees for the 1971, 1972, and 1973 cohorts. I shall deal with the
1971 and 1972 cohorts separately. These cohorts are the lottery-draft cohorts.
Lottery-draft cohorts give us the opportunity to observe behaviour of both draftees and
volunteers in the same cohort. The 1971 cohort file consists of 557,325 enlistees. 3 The
1972 cohort file consists of 434,101 enlistees. Each file has 195 variables about enlistees.
The 1971 cohort file consists of enlistees whose entrance date of service was between
July 1970 and June 1971. The 1971 cohort file consists of enlistees whose entrance date
of service was between July 1971 and June 1972. Enlistees were observed until Septem-
ber 19S7 for each fiscal year during this period. The ones who were out of service settled
in the loss files and the ones who were still in service settled in the master files.
I used the following variables in the files:
1. Lottery" numbers
2. Service of accession
3. HYEC (highest year of education)
4. Term of enlistment
5. Date of entry
6. Date of separation
7. Flag year
Lottery numbers ranged from 1 through 366. Each enlistee had a lottery number
based on his birth date. Lottery numbers were declared for days of the year by a random
choice procedure.
The service of accession variable consists of numbers between 1 and 23, and these











9. Air Force Reserve
10. Marine Corps Reserve
11. Coast Guard
12. Coast Guard Reserve
13. Navy Inductee
14. Air Force Inductee
15. Marine Corps Inductee








In my study. I use the first six categories: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps.
Preinductee. Inductee. If the service of accession of an enlistee is inductee or
preinductee. we can understand that he was certainly drafted. The first four services of
accession show enlistees who joined the military services voluntarily.
Highest year of education variable shows the education level of enlistees. This var-
iable has 13 categories:
1. 1-7 years of education
2. 8 years of education
3. 1 year of education in high school
4. 2 years of education in high school
5. 3-4 years of education in high school (no diploma)
6. High school diploma
7. 1 year of education in college
S. 2 years of education in college
9. 3-4 years of education in college (no degree)
10. College graduate
11. Masters degree or equivalent
12. Doctorate degree or equivalent
13. High school equivalency diploma.
Categories 1 through 5 and 13 show that the enlisted person was a non-high school
graduate. Categories 6 through 12 show that enlisted person had at least a high school
diploma.
Term of enlistment shows the first enlistment period. We can not get the other
enlistment periods from the data. Thus, data restrictions prevent us from having re-
tention rates during service periods of enlistees.
Date of entry and date of separation variables are given as day, month, and year.
The exact entrance and separation date of enlistees can be obtained by looking at these
two variables.
There are two files for each cohort: master file and loss file. Data about enlistees
were recorded in the master files when they entered the military services and checked at
the end of every fiscal year until September 1987. The ones who left the military were
recorded in the loss file.
The flag year-variable consists of four-digit negative or positive numbers. The first
two numbers show the year and the last two numbers show the month of the year. A
positive value indicates that the enlistee was still in service; a negative value indicates
that the enlistee was out of service. If the enlistee was out of service, we can obtain his
separation date by looking at the separation date variable. If the enlistee was still in
service, we should have a positive 8709 value in the flag-year variable. In other words,
a value of 8709 indicates September 1987, which was the last date that corrections to the
files were done, and a positive sign in front of 8709 indicates that the enlistee was still
in service at that time.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In the first chapter, an attempt is made to separate "true" draftees and true volun-
teers from the data set. For this, I used the lottery number ranges which DV1DC re-
commended for "true" draftees and true volunteers. [Ref. 7] After that, I examined the
retention rates and the service lengths for "true" draftees and true volunteers in each of
the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts.
In the second part of chapter one. I predicted the lottery number ranges for "true"
draftees and true volunteers relying on the literature review and on the results in the first
part of chapter one. I examined the retention rates and service lengths for "true"
draftees and true volunteers with new lottery number ranges and compared them with
the preceeding results.
In the second chapter, I examined the effect of education factors on retention rates
and on service lengths of enlistees.
II. ANALYSIS OF RETENTION RATES FOR THE 1971 AND THE 1972
COHORTS
In this chapter, I deal with the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts separately. First. I report
retention rates for draftees and volunteers at the end of the first enlistment period for
each cohort. After that, I examine service lengths for draftees and volunteers in the
same cohort and try to get some conclusions about retention rates. From the data, we
can not know how many times a person reenlisted after the initial reenlistment. All we
can know is the amount of time he stayed, that is, the length of service. Because of that,
we also deal with the service lengths of enlistees in this chapter.
A. METHODOLOGY
I obtained the data from DMDC . There are two files in the data set: one for the
1971 cohort and the other for the 1972 cohort. Each enlistee in these files was observed
between his entrance date and his separation date until September 1987. There was a
loss section and a master section in each file. Enlistees were recorded to the master
section when they entered the military services. At the end of each fiscal year, files were
checked and the ones who had left the service were recorded to the loss section. There
were 557,325 enlistees in the 1971 cohort and 434,101 enlistees in the 1972 cohort.
The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) procedures were used for examining the data
set. The "Proc Frequency" procedure was used to compute retention rates and service
lengths.
B. DATA ANALYSIS
The most difficult task in analyzing the data was to specify a range of lottery num-
bers for draftees and a range for volunteers. DMDC recommended that 1 assume indi-
viduals assigned lottery numbers 1 through 120 to be draftees or draft-induced
volunteers, and those assigned numbers 241 through 366 to be volunteers. Those as-
signed lottery numbers between 120 and 241 were assumed to be in a "gray" area. In
other words, we cannot say much about this latter group as to whether they were drafted
or they were volunteers. Individuals who had lottery numbers between 1 and 120 cer-
tainlv knew that thev would be selected as draftees. Individuals who had a lotterv
number between 241 and 366 knew that they would not be drafted. On the other hand,
the ones who had the lotterv numbers between 120 and 241 could not be sure that thev
would not be drafted. Actually their situation depended on the number of volunteers
whose lottery numbers were between 1 and 366. If the number of volunteers from lot-
tery numbers 1 through 366 were high, then the ones from the "gray" area were less likely
to be drafted. However, it was hard for the ones in the "gray" area to predict how many
volunteers would be from the lottery numbers 1 through 366.







All preinductees and inductees joined the Army: they are listed separately to distin-
guish them from those who joined the Army voluntarily. For the first four types of
service of accessions, an enlisted person is considered a true volunteer if his lottery
number is between 241 and 366; he is assumed to be a draft-motivated volunteer if his
lottery number is between 1 and 120. Those in the last two types of service of accession
are assumed to be "true" draftees. As a result, we will call an enlisted person a "true"
draftee if two conditions hold: his lottery number is 1-120 and his service of accession
is preinductee or inductee. On the other hand, we will call an enlisted person a true
volunteer when his lottery number is 241-366 and his service of accession is one of the
first four types. Note that the "draftee" category will include some people who are true
volunteers: that is. some of those with low lottery numbers who were drafted would have
joined voluntarily anyway. Therefore, the category of draftees is itself a "gray" area, but
is somewhat more distinct than what we have called a "gray" area.
In the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts, I will not use draft-motivated volunteers whose
lottery numbers are 1-120 and whose services of accession are Army, Navy, Air Force
or Marine Corps, and volunteers whose lottery numbers are 241-366, service of ac-
cessions are other than Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps. The number of draft-
motivated volunteers was 160,700 for the 1971 cohort and 158,054 for the 1972 cohort.
The number of volunteers whose service of accession was other than the first four ser-
vices was 5.899 for the 1971 cohort, and 1,376 for the 1972 cohort. I will be using
enlistees in the "gray" area whose lottery numbers are between 121 and 241. We cannot
identifv the enlistees in this "szrav" area as either draftees or volunteers. In this "srav"
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area, we will not deal with enlistees whose service or type of accession is outside the first
six categories.
The original population also shrinks due to erroneous dates or zero lottery numbers,
and due to enlistees who could not be observed for any reason during their service peri-
ods. For example, some entrance dates which were listed as the 31st of certain months
or the 29th of February were rejected because, in reality, there were no such dates. The
lottery numbers should have been 1 through 366 depending on the number of days in a
vear. I deleted all information about enlistees who had zero lottery numbers and erro-
neous entrance or separation dates. The other reason to delete data was the flag year
which showed whether enlistees were still in service or not. The flag-year column has
four-digit numbers. The first two numbers show the year and the last two numbers show
the month. The flag year column should have negative values such as -7109 for enlistees
who left service, and positive 8709 value (1987 was the last fiscal year in which the data
set was corrected) for enlistees who were still in the service. In the flag years, I en-
countered some zero values and some positive values less than 8709 which show that
data cannot be gathered about these enlistees or that enlistees could not be followed
until the end of service period. I deleted all information about enlistees who had those
unacceptable numbers in their flag years. The number of observations lost due to erro-
neous dates for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers was 9,297 for the 1971
cohort and 10,206 for the 1972 cohort. Losses due to miswriting of flag years were
31,79S for the 1971 cohort and 23,760 for the 1972 cohort. Losses due to zero lottery-
numbers were 5 for the 1971 cohort and 2 for the 1972 cohort. Final populations were
349,636 for the 1971 cohort and 240.703 for the 1972 cohort.
Note that the order in my deleting process is important for getting the number of
losses which were mentioned above. Because some of enlistees might have had two or
more deleting reasons together, the order of deleting process may change the number
of losses for the deleting reasons. However, the final populations for the 1971 and the
1972 cohorts will not change with the order in deleting process. In my study, I first de-
leted unacceptable flag years and then deleted zero lottery numbers left in the 1971 and
the 1972 cohorts. Finally, I separated true volunteers, "grays," and "true" draftees in
each cohort, and deleted erroneous dates for only true volunteers, "grays," and for "true"
draftees in each cohort.
Table 2 shows the final populations for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. For further
data interpretations, I will refer to the populations whose sizes are shown in this table.
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1971 COHORT 89.742 166.021 93,873 349.636
1972 COHORT 19.842 112.732 108.129 240.703
1. Retention Rates for the 1971 and the 1972 Cohorts at the End of First Enlistment
Period
If the service length of an enlisted person is longer than his first term of
enlistment period. I accepted the enlisted person as reenlisted. This procedure allows
us to examine retention rates only for the end of the first enlistment period. I divide the
1971 and the 1972 cohorts into three groups: "true" draftees, "grays," and true volun-
teers, by using the procedure mentioned above. Table 3 shows the retention rates for
the 1971 cohort at the end of the first reenlistment period.







"TRUE" DRAFTEES 89.742 12.263 13.7
"GRAYS" 166.021 43.175 26.0
TRUE VOLUNTEERS 93.873 32.267 34.4
Comparing retention rates at the end of the first enlistment period for "true"
draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in the 1971 cohort, we see that the results are close
to our expectations. Retention rates for true volunteers are more than twice as great
as those for "true" draftees. Retention rates for those in the "gray" area are between the
retention rates for "true" draftees and true volunteers. As I mentioned before, we don't
know how many volunteers and draftees are in the "gray" area. By looking at the re-
tention rates for "true" draftees and true volunteers, we can say that as the proportion
of true volunteers to "true" draftees increases in the "gray" area, the retention rate of
enlistees in the "gray" area should also increase.
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Table 4 shows the retention rates for the 1972 cohort at the end of the first
enlistment period.







"TRUE'' DRAFTEES 19,842 2.678 13.5
"GRAYS" 112.732 38.323 34.0
TRUE VOLUNTEERS 108.129 38.126 35.3
As before, comparison of retention rates for "true" draftees, enlistees in the
"gray" area, and true volunteers in the 1972 cohort show that the lowest retention rate
was for "true" draftees and the highest retention rate was for true volunteers. The dif-
ference between the retention rates of "true" draftees and true volunteers is similiar to
that for the 1971 cohort. However, unlike the case for the 1971 cohort, the retention
rate for those in the "gray" area of the 1972 cohort was very close to that of true vol-
unteers. This leads us to believe that most of enlistees in the "gray" area of the 1972
cohort were actually true volunteers.
As a result, the retention rates were higher for true volunteers in both the 1971
and the 1972 cohorts. Retention rates for true volunteers were more than twice as great
as those for "true" draftees in both cohorts. The only difference between the 1971 and
the 1972 cohort is in the "gray" areas. The retention rate for the "gray" area of the 1972
cohort is signifiantly higher than the "gray" area of the 1971 cohort. We would expect
that, as the number of true volunteers increases in the "gray" area, the retention rate will
also increase. Therefore, we may conclude that there were more true volunteers in the
"gray" area of the 1972 cohort than in the "gray" area of the 1971 cohort.
Retention rates were around 13 percent for "true" draftees and 35 percent for
true volunteers. We can conclude that draftees were less likely to reenlist in the 1971
and the 1972 cohorts.
In my research, there are two major problems with the data. I believe that these
problems will not affect the main result that the reenlistment rate is higher for true vol-
unteers, but they may somewhat affect the ratio of retention rates between "true"
draftees and true volunteers.
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First, we can come to a conclusion on retention rates only at the end of the first
enlistment period due to data restrictions.
Second, we divided the lottery numbers from 1 through 366 into three roughly
equal sections as DMDC recomended, and named the first section as "true" draftees,
second section as the "gray" area, and the third section as true volunteers. This process
creates a large "gray" area, about which we cannot say much.
For solving the first problem, I examine the service lengths of the enlistees. For
the second problem, I try to make the "gray" area smaller.
2. Service Lengths for the 1971 and the 1972 Cohorts
In this section, I examine service lengths of enlistees for the 1971 and the 1972
cohorts separately. Since we don't have all the enlistment periods except for the first
term of enlistment for enlistees in the data, I examine service lengths of enlistees to get
some idea about their service periods. We know that the military services would like to
have longer service periods for enlistees for two main reasons: first, long service periods
will decrease training costs. Second, it will affect the force effectiveness level positively.
If enlistees stay in the services for long periods, the military services will need fewer
trainers. Fewer trainers mean lower costs. Long service periods will also increase the
number of careerists in the force. As the number of the careerists increases, the level
of force effectiveness will increase. [Ref. 8]
I again divide both the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts into "true" draftees, "gray"
area, and true volunteers by using the same procedure mentioned above. I assign lottery'
numbers 1 through 120 for draftees, 121 through 240 for the enlistees in the "gray" area,
and 241 through 366 for volunteers. I examine the service length of "true" draftees,
"grays," and true volunteers in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts separately. By using the
"Proc Frequency" in SAS, I obtain the percentage "true" draftees, "grays" and true vol-
unteers who had the same service lengths, year by year. For simplicity, I present my
results with tables and figures for each cohort. Table 5 and Figure 1 show service
lengths for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in the 1971 cohort. Table 6 and
Figure 2 show service lengths for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in the 1972
cohort.
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Table 5. SERVICE LENGTHS FOR THE 1971 COHORT METHOD 1
Length of Service
Period (years).
"True" Draftees "Grays" (%). True Volunteers
0-1 12.3 14.0 15.6
1-2 77.7 35.9 20.4
2-3 5.5 15.7 IS.
6
3-4 0.9 16.1 19.4
4-5 0.5 2.8 3.7
5-6 0.6 2.4 3.2
6-7 0.5 1.8 2.6
7-8 0.6 2.1 2.8
8-9 0.3 1.2 1.8
9-10 0.2 0.9 1.2
10-11 0.2 0.5 0.8
11-12 0.1 0.5 0.8
12-13 0.2 0.5 0.7
13-14 0.1 0.5 0.7
14-15 0.1 0.4 0.6
15-16 0.1 0.3 0.5
16 > 0.1 4.4 6.6
Total 100 100 100
15
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Figure 1. Service lengths for the 1971 cohort: METHOD 1
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"Grays" (%). True Volunteers
0-1 13.7 15.4 15.6
1-2 75.1 19.2 17.7
2-3 6.5 20.0 20.1
3-4 0.8 19.6 19.7
4-5 0.6 4.0 4.2
5-6 0.7 3.3 3.3
6-7 0.6 2.5 2.5
7-8 0.6 2.8 3.0
8-9 0.3 1.7 l.S
9-10 0.2 1.3 1.3
10-11 0.3 0.7 O.S
11-12 0.1 0.7 0.8
12-13 0.2 0.8 O.S
13-14 0.1 0.6 0.6
14-15 0.1 0.5 0.6
15 > 0.1 6.9 7.2
Total 100 100 100
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Figure 2. Service lengths for the 1972 cohort: Method 1
Table 5 and Figure 1 show service lengths of enlistees in different perspectives.
Table 5 gives the percentage of "true" draftees, enlistees in the "gray" area, and true
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volunteers in relation to their service lengths for the cohort that enlisted between July
1970 and June 1971. As an example, we can understand from Table 5 that 12.3 percent
of "true" draftees, 14.0 percent of "grays," and 15.6 percent of true volunteers had service
lengths of one year or less. To get the percentage of enlistees who had service periods
of 2 years or less, we should add the first two rows. By adding two rows, we will obtain
90 percent of "true" draftees, 49.9 percent of "grays," and 36 percent of true volunteers.
We can also see from Figure 1 that at the end of a two-year service period, the number
of "true" draftees decreased by 90 percent, the number of enlistees in the "gray" area
decreased by 49.9 percent, and number of true volunteers decreased by 36 percent. From
Table 5, we can see that the percentages of true volunteers for long service periods were
higher than those for "true" draftees.
It is apparent from Figure 2 that true volunteers and "grays" had the longest
service lengths. In other words, the decrease in the number of true volunteers was less
sharp than for "true" draftees during the service period. For true volunteers, sudden
decreases occurred by the end of the first four-year period. The reason is the three or
four year first enlistment period for true volunteers. For "true" draftees, sudden de-
creases can be seen at the end of first two years of service period. The reason is the two
year first enlistment period for draftees. By the end of the first two years, almost 90
percent of "true" draftees left the services. At the end of the first four years, 74 percent
of true volunteers left the services and 26 percent of them stayed in the services. On the
other hand, I have found a 34 percent reenlistment rate for true volunteers at the end
of the first enlistment period. From Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 8 percent difference may
be explained by lower retention rate for true volunteers during the first 8 years of service.
I accepted as reenlistees true volunteers who had first enlistment period of 3 years if their
service period were greater than their first enlistment period. Table 6 shows that 19.7
percent of true volunteers left the military between 3 and 4 years of service. Some of
those who left the military in this period were the ones who had reenlisted after the
3-year first enlistment period. Because of the people who reenlisted after the 3 years of
service and left the services for any reason between 3 and 4 years of service, the retention
rate is 8 percent less at the end of 4 years of service than what I found by looking at the
retention rate at the end of first enlistment period.
Enlistees in the "gray" area follow an intermediate pattern. This pattern de-
pends on how many "true" draftees and true volunteers are in the "gray" area. If the
number of "true" draftees in the "gray" area is high, the pattern should be closer to the
pattern of true draftees; otherwise it will be closer to the pattern of true volunteers.
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Unfortunately, we don't have the number of "true" draftees and true volunteers in the
"gray" area.
From Figure 1, we see that enlistees in the "gray" area of the 1971 cohort follow
a pattern closer to that of true volunteers than that to that of "true" draftees. On the
other hand, we should not forget that if we change the ranges of lottery numbers used
to ascertain whether people are "true" draftees, "grays," or true volunteers, then the ser-
vice length patterns for people in these three categories will most likely differ.
Table 6 and Figure 2 are similiar to those for the 1971 cohort. With the same
method I use for the 1971 cohort, we can interpret results from Table 6 and Figure 2
for the 1972 cohort.
Differences in service lengths for "true" draftees and for true volunteers are
similiar to those for the 1971 cohort. So. we can conclude again that true volunteers
have higher service lengths than "true" draftees.
The most important difference between the 1971 and the 1972 cohort is for
those in the "gray" area. In the 1972 cohort, enlistees in the "gray" area show very
similiar patterns to true volunteers. We know from the literature review that there was
more certainty for the individuals who would be drafted in the 1972 cohort compared
with the 1971 cohort. So this might have wiped out the "gray" area in the 1972 cohort.
This suggests that there were few draftees in the "gray" area of the 1972 cohort.
3. Retention Rates and Service Lengths by Changing Lottery Numbers Range for
"True" Draftees, "Grays," and True Volunteers
In this section we assign different lottery numbers for "true" draftees, "grays,"
and true volunteers in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. For the 1971 cohort, the lottery
numbers are assigned as follows: 1 through 150 for "true" draftees, 151 through 240 for
"grays," and 241 through 366 for true volunteers. For the 1972 cohort the lottery num-
bers are: 1 through 90 for "true" draftees, 91 through 210 for "grays," and 211 through
366 for true volunteers. The following discussion summarizes the two reasons that led
us to change lottery numbers for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in the 1971
and the 1972 cohorts.
First, when we look at the literature review, we understand that one's chances
of being drafted were not the same for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. Because the lot-
tery did not run smoothly during the early periods of 1970, there was great uncertainty
about one's chances of being drafted. In the early period of the lottery system there was
not a direct national call; that is, local boards had different lottery number ceilings. This
caused different chances of being drafted for people who lived in different areas. To
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solve this inequity among individuals, Selective Service established ceilings on lottery
numbers that prevented many local boards from meeting their quotas. In other words,
shortfalls occurred. The final solution to establish equity among individuals was the
direct national call. The direct national call became a law in Septemberl971. However,
to overcome shortfalls like those that had occurred before, a higher number of enlistees
was drafted in the early periods of the direct national call. Because Selective Service
could not adjust immediately to the changes in the lottery draft system, fluctuations in
the number of draft calls occurred in 1970 and 1971. On the other hand, the increase in
the number of withdrawals from Vietnam during the period of the 1972 cohort decreased
significantly the number of enlistees who were drafted. Contrary to the experience of the
1971 cohort , draft quotas were declared in advance for the 1972 cohort and were never
exceeded. There was no further reform to the lottery system and the number of draft
calls was reduced during this period. The purpose was a "zero draft" to establish the
All-volunteer Force. These events made people in the 1972 cohort more certain about
their chances of being drafted.
Second, based on the first part of my data analysis, it is not appropriate to use
same lottery numbers for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in both the 1971
and the 1972 cohorts. Table 2 shows that there is a large difference in the number of
"true" draftees between the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. By comparing Figure 1 and
Figure 2 we can realize the difference in behaviour of the "grays". We may conclude that
accepting higher lottery number ceilings than necessary for "true" draftees in the 1972
cohort prevents us from seeing the behaviour of real "grays".
To get an idea of how high up the lottery number scale the Selective Service
reached each month, I examined the number of enlistees for each lottery number. Each
month, enlistees were drafted beginning from the lottery number 1, according to se-
quential lottery numbers until quotas were filled. After that, as the lottery number in-
creased, the number of enlistees who joined the services decreased. However, it is hard
to choose the particular lottery number separating the ones who were drafted from the
ones who joined voluntarily because there might have been true volunteers who had
lottery numbers smaller than the ceiling of monthly lottery draft number. I made a
rough separation for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. According to my results, the lottery
numbers of draftees were between 1 through 180 for the 1971 cohort, and between 1 and
110 for the 1972 cohort. It is apparent from these results that there was an important
difference between lottery numbers of those who were drafted in the 1971 cohort and
those drafted in the 1972 cohort.
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As a result, in the 1971 cohort, we make the range of lottery numbers larger for
"true" draftees, smaller for the "gray" area, and larger for true volunteers. In the 1972
cohort, we made the range of lottery numbers smaller for "true" draftees and larger for
true volunteers.
Because I changed the range of lottery numbers for "true" draftees, "grays," and
true volunteers, final populations would be different for both the 1971 and 1972 cohorts.
The following summarizes the reasons for deleting observations and the number
of observations deleted from the original data sets4 :
1. Due to draft-motivated volunteers: 197,764 were deleted from the 1971 cohort, and
124,066 from the 1972 cohort.
2. Due to volunteers whose service of accession was other than Army, Navy, Air
Force, or Marine Corps: 7,255 were deleted from the 1971 cohort, and 3.291 from
the 1972 cohort.
3. Due to unacceptable flag years: 31,798 were deleted from the 1971 cohort, and
23.760 from the 1972 cohort.
4. Due to erroneous entrance and separation dates for "true" draftees, "grays," and
true volunteers: S, 176 were deleted from the 1971 cohort, and 11,340 from the 1972
cohort.
5. Due to zero lottery numbers: 5 were deleted from the 1971 cohort, and 2 from the
1972 cohort.
Table 7 shows the final populations for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. For
further data interpretations. I will refer to the populations whose sizes are shown in this
table.







1971 COHORT 104.796 90.576 116.945 312.317
1972 COHORT 18.313 54.952 198.377 271.642
If we compare Table 7 with Table 2, we see that the number of enlistees in each
category changed with new lottery number ranges. For the 1971 cohort, the number of
"true" draftees and true volunteers increased, and the number of "grays" decreased. For
4 Deleting reasons were explained in detail in the "Data Analysis" section of this thesis.
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the 1972 cohort, the number of "true" draftees and "grays" decreased, and the number
of true volunteers increased.
We examine separately the retention rates at the end of the first enlistment pe-
riod and service lengths for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. By comparing the results
with the first part of this chapter, we are able to realize the effect of using a different
range of lottery numbers for "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers on estimated
retention rates and service lengths.
a. Retention Rates for the 1971 and the 1972 Cohorts at the End of First
Enlistment Period
Reenlistment rates at the end of first enlistment period are presented in
Table 8 for the 1971 cohort, and in Table 9 for the 1972 cohort.







"TRUE" DRAFTEES 104.796 14.109 13.5
"GRAYS" 90.576 22.466 24.S
TRUE VOLUNTEERS 116.965 40,082 34.3







"TRUE" DRAFTEES 18,313 2.454 13.4
GRAYS" 54.952 17,475 31.8
TRUE VOLUNTEERS 19S.377 69.357 35.0
Comparing the retention rates for the new lottery number ranges in Table
3 and Table 4 with those for the old lottery numbers ranges in Table 8 and Table 9, I
found mainly slight differences for both cohorts. The only noticeable difference was for
the "grays" of the 1972 cohort. With the new lottery numbers ranges, the retention rate
of "grays" in the 1972 cohort decreased by 2.2 percentage points. This change increased
the difference in retention rates between "grays" and true volunteers in the 1972 cohort.
However, the approximately 3 percentage point difference in retention rates between
"grays" and true volunteers in the 1972 cohort is not laree.
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b. Service Lengths for the 1971 and the 1972 Cohorts
The following tables and figures summarize the results of service lengths for
the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. Table 10 and Figure 3 show service lengths for the 1971
cohort. Table 11 and Figure 4 show the service leneths for the 1972 cohort.





"Grays" (%). True Volunteers
(%).
0-1 10.6 13.8 15.7
1-2 79.6 38.7 20.4
2-3 5.4 15.0 18.6
3-4 0.8 15.4 19.4
4-5 0.6 2.6 3.7
5-6 0.5 2.3 3.2
6-7 0.5 1.6 2.5
7-8 0.6 2.0 2.S
S-9 0.3 1.1 l.S
9-10 0.2 0.9 1.2
10-11 0.2 0.5 0.9
11-12 0.1 0.5 0.7
12-13 0.2 0.4 0.7
13-14 0.1 0.5 0.7
14-15 0.1 0.3 0.6
15-16 0.1 0.4 0.5
16> 0.1 4.0 6.6
Total 100 100 100
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Figure 3. Service lengths for the 1971 cohort: Method 2
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Table 11. SERVICE LENGTHS FOR THE 1972 COHORT: METHOD 2
Length of Service
Period (years).
"True" Draftees "Grays" (%). True Volunteers
0-1 13.4 15.2 15.5
1-2 75.5 20.5 17.8
2-3 6.4 19.8 20.3
3-4 0.9 20.5 19.7
4-5 0.6 3.8 4.1
5-6 0.7 3.2 3.4
6-7 0.6 -> i 2.5
7-8 0.6 2.7 2.9
8-9 0.2 1.7 1.9
9-10 0.2 1.1 1.2
10-11 0.3 0.7 0.8
11-12 0.1 0.7 0.8
12-13 0.2 0.6 0.8
13-14 0.1 0.6 0.6
14-15 0.1 0.5 0.5
15> 0.1 6.2 7.2
Total 100 100 100
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Figure 4. Service lengths for the 1972 cohort: Method 2
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By comparing the service lengths in old lottery numbers ranges with those
in new lottery numbers ranges, I found slight differences in the service lengths of the
1971 cohort. With new lottery numbers, service lengths of the 1972 cohort did not
change much for "true" draftees and true volunteers. The only change in service lengths
was for "grays" of the 1972 cohort. Comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 2 shows that
new lottery' number ranges make more distinguishable the difference between service
lengths of "grays" and true volunteers in the 1972 cohort.
C. CONCLUSIONS
I have examined the retention rates and service lengths in the 1971 and the 1972
cohorts separately. We conclude that retention rates at the end of the first enlistment
period are higher and service lengths are longer for true volunteers than for "true"
draftees. Differences in retention rates and service lengths between "true" draftees and
true volunteers are significant for manpower policy decisions.
In the second part of my study, I changed the range of lottery numbers for "true"
draftees, "grays," and true volunteers by relying on the literature review and the differ-
ence which I found between monthly ceilings of lottery numbers for the 1971 cohort and
those for the 1972 cohort. Nevertheless, I could not get large differences for both the
1971 and the 1972 cohorts. In spite of this, I still believe that the appropriate ranges
of lottery numbers used to distinguish "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers in the
1971 cohort are different from those that should be used for the 1972 cohort. Even a
careful examination of the lottery numbers of draftees month by month for the 1971
cohort did not lead to the conclusion that we should change substantially the range of
lottery numbers previously used to define "true" draftees. Because the lottery number
range of "true" draftees in the 1971 cohort is smaller than it should be. it does not in-
clude "grays" and so does not bias the results for "true" draftees. However, the lottery
numbers recommended by DMDC -1 through 120 for "true" draftees, 121 through 240
for "grays," 241 through 366 for true volunteers-- do not seem reasonable for the 1972
cohort. In the 1972 cohort, the lottery range of "true" draftees is higher than it should
be and so includes "grays;" therefore, the results for "true" draftees are biased.
However, we may conclude by comparing the "grays" in the 1971 and the 1972
cohorts that there were verv few draft-motivated volunteers in the 1972 cohort.
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III. EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL FACTORS ON RETENTION RATES
AND SERVICE LENGTHS
In this chapter, I deal with the effect of educational factors on retention rates and
service lengths. In order to examine the effect of educational factors, I divide both the
1971 and the 1972 cohorts into two categories as described in Chapter 1: high school
diploma graduates(HSDGs) and non-high school diploma graduates(NHSDGs). Note
that I accept enlistees who had at least a high school education as HSDGs and enlistees
who had education lower than high school as NHSDGs. I compare HSDGs and
NHSDGs for "true" draftees, for "grays," and for true volunteers in the 1971 and the
1972 cohorts separately. The 1971 and the 1972 cohorts are divided into three sections
according to lottery numbers as in the last part of Chapter 2. Enlistees are assigned
lottery numbers 1 through 150, 151 through 240, and 241 through 366 for the 1971
cohort, and 1 through 90, 91 through 210 and 211 through 366 for the 1972 cohort. I
assume enlistees who were in the first section and whose service of accession was
preinductee or inductee to be "true" draftees, enlistees in the second section to be
"grays," and enlistees in the third section and whose service of accession was Army,
Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps to be true volunteers.
Final populations for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts are presented in Table 12.
These are the populations that will be referred to in further data interpretations.
Table 12. FINAL POPULATIONS FOR THE 1971 AND THE 1972 COHORTS:






1971 Cohort 104,737 90.561 116,929 312.227
1972 Cohort 18,309 54.948 19S.370 271.627
Differences in the final populations for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts from the last
part of Chapter 2 are because of the enlistees who had zero values in their "Highest Year
of Education" variable. A zero value shows that information about these enlistees could
not be obtained. All information about the enlistees who had a zero value in the
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"Highest Year of Education" variable is deleted. Deletions due to a zero value are 90 for
the 1971 cohort and 15 for the 1972 cohort.
I examine retention rates for HSDGs and NHSDGs at the end of the first enlistment
period. Table 13 and Table 14 present retention rates at the end of the first enlistment
period for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts.
Table 13. RETENTION RATES AT THE END OF FIRST ENLISTMENT PE-






























Table 14. RETENTION RATES AT THE END OF FIRST ENLISTMENT PE-































I also examine service lenghts of HSDGs and XHSDGs. The following Tables and
Figures summarize the results for HSDGs and for NHSDGs. Table 15 and Figure 5
through Figure 7 present service lengths for the 1971 cohort. Table 16 and Figures 7
through 9 present service lengths for the 1972 cohort.
























0-1 10.4 18.7 11.2 20.0 12.2 20.7
1-2 SO. 9 67.7 40.3 34.4 16.8 25.3
2-3 5.0 6.S 13.9 17.9 16.7 21.4
3-4 0.6 1.2 17.1 11.0 23.7 13.2
4-5 0.5 1.1 2.4 3.2 3.7 3.8
5-6 0.4 1.0 2.3 2.4 3.5 2.8
6-7 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.2
7-8 0.5 0.9 2.0 1.9 3.3 2.1
8-9 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.3
9-10 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.9
10-11 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7
11-12 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6
12-13 0.
1
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6
13-14 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 O.S 0.6
14-15 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4
15 > 0.2 0.3 5.1 2.7 9.8 3.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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0-1 10.8 24.2 12.5 21.8 12.3 21.3
1-2 78.8 61.
S
19.0 23.9 14.9 23.3
2-3 6.3 6.8 1S.8 22.3 19.0 22.5
3-4 0.8 1.3 23.4 13.3 23.1 13.6
4-5 0.4 1.3 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.2
5-6 0.6 1.1 3.6 2.4 3.8 2.5
6-7 0.6 0.8 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.3
7-8 0.5 0.8 2.8 2.1 3.3 2.3
8-9 0.2 o.3 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.3
9-10 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.9 1.5 O.S
10-11 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.6
11-12 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
12-13 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6
13-14 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4
14-15 0.
1
o.l 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
15 > 0.1 0.
1
7.5 3.2 9.4 3.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Figure 5. Service lengths for "true" draftees in the 1971 cohort: Study of Educa-
tional Factors
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Figure 6. Sen ice lengths for "grays'" in the 1971 cohort: Study of Educational
Factors
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Figure 7. Sen ice lengths for true volunteers in the 1971 cohort: Study of Educa-
tional Factors
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Figure 8. Sen ice lengths for "true" draftees in the 1972 cohort: Study of Educa-
tional Factors
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Figure 9. Sen ice lengths for "grays" in the 1972 cohort: Study of Educational
Factors
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SERVICE LENGTHS FOR TRUE VOLUNTEERS
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES




Table 13 and Table 14 show the retention rates at the end of the first enlistment
period for high school diploma graduates (HSDGs) and for non-high school diploma
graduates (NHSDGs) in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts.
Retention rates of "true" draftees at the end of the first enlistment period were
slightly higher for NHSDGs than HSDGs in both the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. On
the other hand, the retention rates of true volunteers were higher for HSDGs than
NHSDGs in both the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. According to the results for "grays,"
high school and non-high school diploma graduates did not show the same retention
behaviour in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts: the retention rate for HSDGs was lower
than for NHSDGs in the 1971 cohort, but it was higher than for NHSDGs in the 1972
cohort. Those results suggest the following conclusions.
First, because "true" draftees without high school diplomas had less opportunity
than those with high school diplomas to find a better job out of the military services,
they were more likely to stay in the military services.
Second, true volunteers with high school diplomas had voluntarily rejected civilian
alternatives in favor of the military. Therefore, they were more likely to be successful
and to reenlist than true volunteers without high school diplomas. Because high school
is a sound indicator of the likelihood of succesfully completing the first enlistment period
[Ref. 3: pp.10], HSDGs had higher chances than NHSDGs of being successful in the
military services.
We cannot rely on the retention rate results of "grays" because we do not know the
number of true draftees and of true volunteers in the "gray" area. The reason is that for
"true" draftees, NHSGs had higher retention rates than HSDGs. whereas for true vol-
unteers the reverse was the case. Therefore, if there were more "true" draftees than true
volunteers in the "gray" area of the 1971 cohort, retention rates at the end of the first
enlistment period would have been higher for NHSDGs than if there were more true
volunteers than "true" draftees.
I also examine service lengths of HSDGs and NHSDGs in the 1971 and the 1972
cohorts. Table 15 and Table 16 give the results in percentages for years of services. By
looking at Figure 5 through Figure 10, I conclude the following about HSDGs and
NHSDGs.
Sudden decreases in the number of enlistees are observed in the first two years of
service for "true" draftees, and in the first four years of service for true volunteers. After
the first enlistment period, decreases in the percent of enlistees were almost the same for
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HSDGs and NHSDGs. After the first reenlistment decision, enlistees were on their way
to being careerists, and high school education had very little effect on their continuation
rates. However, it is apparent from Figure 5 through Figure 10 that except for "true"
draftees, HSDGs had longer service periods in the military. Note that the most impor-
tant reason for HSDGs to have longer service periods is that they had lower attrition
rates in the initial enlistment period.
In the Syllogistics study, continuation rates for "true" draftees and true volunteers
are examined in detail. [Ref. 9] The assumptions they use to identify the number of
"true" draftees and true volunteers during lottery draft years allow them to get more
precise results. The Syllogistics researchers divide the lottery numbers into three draft
probability categories: high draft-probability lottery numbers were 1 through 120; me-
dium draft-probability numbers were 121 through 240; and low draft-probability num-
bers were 241 through 365. Note that Syllogistics doesn't include people born on
February 29. They are sure about number of true volunteers who were assigned lottery
numbers 241 through 365 because the lottery number called had never reached 241 be-
tween FY 1970 and FY 1972. Because the three categories of draft numbers are of al-
most equal size, the Syllogistics researchers assume that, if there were no draft calls at
that time, there would have been almost the same number of volunteers in each of three
sections. By substracting the number of true volunteers from the number of draftees
whose lottery numbers were 1 through 120, they obtain the number of "true" draftees.
The Syllogistics researchers examine the continuation rates of HSDGs and
NHSDGs for "true" draftees and for true volunteers. They find that true volunteers with
high school diplomas and "true" draftees without high school diplomas had higher rates
of entry into careers.
In spite o[ using different techniques from that of the Syllogistics study, I find al-
most the same main results. Relying on the results, we may conclude for the 1971 and
the 1972 cohorts that XHSDG "true" draftees and HSDG true volunteers were more
likely to stay in the military.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this study, I have examined the retention rates and service lengths, and how they
are affected by educational factors, for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. To do so, I have
used two different methods( Method 1 and Method 2) for dividing enlistees by lottery
number into "true" draftees, "grays," and true volunteers.
Results showed that retention rates at the end of the first enlistment period were
higher for true volunteers than for "true" draftees in both cohorts. Retention rates for
true volunteers were more than twice as great as those for "true" draftees. Except for
"grays" in the 1972 cohort, retention rates for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts were similar
in both Method 1 and Method 2. By using Method 2, the difference in retention rates
between "grays" and true volunteers in the 1972 cohort was increased slightly.
By examining the service lengths of draftees in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. I
conclude that service lengths in the first enlistment period were higher for true volunteers
than for "true" draftees in both cohorts. A sudden decrease in the number of draftees
was observed at the end of the two years of service period. The reason is that the first
enlistment period for draftees was two years. Each year during the first four years of
service for true volunteers, between 15 and 20 percent left the military. However, for
true volunteers, the highest percent left during or at the end of the fourth year of service.
The reason is that the first enlistment period for volunteers was typically three or four
years.
Another notable finding is the different retention behaviour of "grays" in the 1971
and 1972 cohorts. In the 1971 cohort, the retention behaviour of "grays" followed a
pattern between "true" draftees and true volunteers. On the other hand, the retention
behaviour of "grays" in the 1972 cohort was very close to that for true volunteers. I tried
to estimate how high up the lottery number scale the Selective Service reached each
month. Relying on my results and on the literature review, I concluded that one's
chances of being drafted was different in the 1971 cohort than in the 1972 cohort.
Contrary to the case for the 1971 cohort, there was much greater certainty about one's
chance of being drafted in the 1972 cohort. This certainty about one's chance of being
drafted virtually wiped out the "gray" area in the 1972 cohort.
As a result, by examining retention rates and service lengths for "true" draftees and
true volunteers. I conclude that retention rates at the end of the first enlistment period
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were higher and service lengths longer for true vounteers than for "true" draftees. Dif-
ferences in retention rates and service lengths between "true" draftees and true volunteers
are significiant for manpower policy decisions.
I also examined the effect of educational factors on retention rates, and on service
lengths in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts. Except for "grays", the effect of educational
factors was consistent for "true" draftees and true volunteers in both two cohorts. Re-
sults show that the retention rates of "true" draftees at the end of the first enlistment
period were slightly higher for NHSDGs than for HSDGs in both cohorts. On the other
hand, the retention rates of true volunteers were higher for HSDGs than for NHSDGs
in both cohorts. HSDGs and NHSDGs in the "gray" area did not show the same re-
tention behaviour in the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts: the retention rate for HSDGs was
lower than for NHSDGs in the 1971 cohort, but it was higher than for NHSDGs in the
1972 cohort. Relying on my results, I offer the following conclusions.
First, because "true" draftees without high school diplomas had less opportunity
than did those with high school diplomas to find a better job out of the military, they
were more likely to stay in the military.
Second, true volunteers with high school diplomas had voluntarily rejected civilian
alternatives in favor of the military. Therefore, they were more likely to be successful
and to reenlist than were true volunteers without high school diplomas.
Third, we cannot rely on the retention rate results of "grays" because we do not
know the number of "true" draftees and of true volunteers in the "gray" area. The reason
is that for "true" draftees. NHSDGs had higher retention rates than did HSDGSs,
whereas for true volunteers the reverse was the case. Therefore, if there were more "true"
draftees than true volunteers in the "gray" area of the 1971 cohort, retention rates at the
end of the first enlistment period would have been higher for NHSDGs than if there were
more true volunteers than "true" draftees.
By examining the effect of educational factors on service lengths in the 1971 and the
1972 cohorts, I conclude the following about HSDGs and NHSDGs.
Sudden decreases in the number of enlistees are observed in the first two years of
service for "true" draftees, and in the first four years of service for true volunteers. After
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the first enlistment period, decreases in the percent of enlistees were almost the same for
HSDGs and NHSDGs. After the first enlistment decision, enlistees were on their way
to being careerists, and high school education had very little effect on their continuation
rates.
Finally, I conclude for the 1971 and the 1972 cohorts that N'HSDG "true" draftees
and HSGD true volunteers were more likely to stay in the military.
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of important events is from Appendix A of Reference 2.
Lottery draft begins.
Program Evalutaion Group, Project Volunteer Committee, re-
ports All Volunteer Force is feasible if sufficient incentives are
made available.
The President's Advisory Commission sends to President Nixon
its report recommending immediate entry level pay raises for
military personnel and the end of the draft in 1971.
National Security Council decision to set aside S3. 5 billion in
FY 1973 funds to move to a volunteer force.
President Nixon announces the Administration's decisions to
seek military pay raises and an extension of the draft beyond
July 1971, and to move toward ending the draft.
Project Volunteer Committee submits its report to the Secretary
of Defense recommending a program to reach an All Volunteer
Force.
Secretary Laird informs Secretaries of Military Departments and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the "goal is to reach
zero draft calls by the end of FY1973."
General William A. Westmoreland announces in a speech to the
Association of the U.S. Army that the Army will leave "no stone
unturned'' to reach a volunteer force.
Lt. General George Forsythe appointed as the Special Assistant
for the Modern Volunteer Army.
Secretary Laird approves SI,5 billion Project Volunteer proeram
for FY 1972.
First Annual Joint DOD Recruiting Conference held to plan for
expansion and strengthening of Recruiting Services.
President sends to Congress legislation to increase military pay,
to reform the draft, and to extend the draft until July 1973.
Army reprograms funds to initate Project Volar to improve
Service living conditions and to conduct paid radio-TV adver-
tising campaign.
House and Senate Armed Services Commitees begin hearings



















Army offers attractive new enlistment options: unit-of-choice,
geographic area of choice, school and career field of choice.
Army begins paid radio-TV advertising campaign.
House approves most of the Administration's program but
doubles the Administration's recommendations for increased
military compensation.
Senate passes amended version of House bill and reduces the
compensation provisions to the Administration's proposals.
Under FY 1972 budget, new funds become available for volun-
teer force( actions which do not require legislative authority).
House and Senate conferees agree on compromise bill to extend
and reform the draft and to increase compensation S2.4 billion.
In PublicLaw 92-129, Congress enacts legislation to extend draft
for two years, to end undergraduate deferments, to implement
a direct national call, and to provide substantial increase in
entry pay, and other volunteer force legislation.
Air Force offers guaranteed school-of-choice in return for six-
year enlistment.
Office of Management and Budget limits FY1973 Project Vol-
unteer budget to continuation of existing program; expansion
of the program is disapproved.
Central All Volunteer Force appointed to furnish staff assist-
ance in the volunteer force effort.
Special Pay Act of 1972, designed to solve special manning
problems of the volunteer force, is introduced in Congress; never
gets out of committee.
Ground Combat Enlistment Bonus initiated in Army and Ma-
rine Corps.
Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Emmit Tidd appointed
Commander, Naval Recruiting Command, to reverse downward
trend in Navy recruiting.
Congress passes Uniformed Services Health Professions
Revitalization Act of 1972, authorizing medical university for
the Services and increasing medical scholarships.
Congress approves S14 million supplemental funds for Navy re-
cruiting and advertising.
Last draft call is issued.
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